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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Umumnya syarikat-syarikat yang tertakluk di bawah garispanduan dan kawalan 
terhadap perakaunan dan belanjawan mendapat hasil yang di luar jangkaan di akhir 
tahun kewangan.  Penyelidik cuba memahami hubungan di antara amalan kawalan 
belanjawan yang ketat terhadap sasaran pencapaian belanjawan yang memberi kesan 
terhadap prestasi kewangan syarikat-syarikat pembuatan multinasional di Malaysia, 
yang majoriti atau keseluruhannya beribu pejabat di luar negara. Di samping itu, 
dimensi di dalam struktur organisasi telah dimasukan sebagai kerangka kajian. 
Penyelidik percaya ianya akan menjadi faktor penyederhana antara kawalan 
belanjawan yang ketat dan tahap kelonggaran di dalam mencapai sasaran belanjawan.  
Pelbagai karya mengenai struktur organisasi mengandaikan ianya memberikan kesan 
terhadap hubungan tersebut.  Sebanyak tujuh puluh  maklumbalas yang boleh 
digunakan telah diterima.  Kebolehpercayaan dan kesahihan soalan-soalan 
menunjukkan ianya adalah signifikan.  Analisis deskriptif, Pearson dan regresi 
baganda telah dilakukan terhadap pembolehubah-pembolehubah.  Keseluruhan hasil 
kajian mencadangkan kekuatan  terhadap belanjawan berkaitan komunikasi bersama 
tahap (tinggi/rendah) penerimaan terhadap kajian semula belanjawan. Ini  menjadikan 
tahap (tinggi/rendah) kelonggaran di dalam sasaran pencapaian belanjawan, 
menyumbang kepada prestasi yang tinggi/rendah sesebuah syarikat. Dapatan yang 
kedua membenarkan sasaran belanjawan yang terkeluar daripada yang dihasratkan 
dan ianya menyumbang kepada pencapaian prestasi kewangan yang tinggi. Kajian 
membuktikan (mengesahkan) bahawa semakin tinggi tahap kelonggaran dalam 
 12 
sasaran pencapaian belanjawan, semakin tinggi prestasi kewangan sesebuah firma. 
Hasil kajian tidak menunjukkan sebarang kesan dalam struktur organisasi sebagai 
penyederhana. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Companies under accounting and budgetary control guidelines in general ended the 
financial years with surprisingly unexpected results. The researcher seeks to 
understand the relationship of tight budgetary control practices on the budgetary 
target achievement, which in turn affects firm financial performance of the Malaysian 
MNC manufacturers that are majority or wholly foreign owned with their 
headquarters overseas. In addition, an extra dimension of organizational structure was 
added to the research framework which the author believes would moderate the 
relationship between TBC practices and the level of ease in budget target 
achievement. Numerous articles on organizational structure infer that it does affect 
the said relationship. Seventy useable replies were received. Reliability and validity 
of the questionnaires set are adequately significant. Descriptive analysis, Pearson’s 
correlation analysis and multiple regressions were carried out amongst the variables. 
Reaffirming some existing literatures, the study confirms that the higher / lower the 
level of ease in budget target achievement, the lower / higher the firm financial 
performance. A second finding is that lower / higher level of acceptance in budget 
revision during the year would result in higher / lower level of ease in budget target 
achievement, which leads to lower / higher firm performance. However the study 
unexpectedly did not unravel any moderating effect of organizational structure.  
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                                                                                                                             CHAPTER 1                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                         INTRODUCTION                                                               
 
1.1 Background of Study 
 
Over the past 25 years, accounting researchers have researched 
extensively into the relationships of participative budget setting and its 
corresponding performance. Much remained to be discovered especially in the 
area of tight budgetary control (TBC) practices and its relationship and impact on 
subsequent performance. Van der Stede (2001) researched the measuring of TBC 
practices from 153 regional Belgium general managers. The general managers are 
at the level immediately below corporate management of large, diversified firms 
headquartered in Belgium.  
This study intends to further the Van der Stede (2001)’s TBC 
measures to performance of manufacturing firms located in Malaysia. With the 
exception of a few, most Strategic Business Units (SBUs)) in Malaysia are 
predominantly foreign owned. These SBUs, whether wholly or majority share 
foreign owned, have different organizational structures that support the business 
venture. These SBUs are multinational corporations (MNCs) with their 
headquarters in foreign countries. 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) from more than 60 foreign 
countries have invested in over 3,000 companies in Malaysia’s manufacturing 
sector. Many of them have re-invested in multiple projects (www.mida.gov.my). 
Some of the MNCss, for instance, the Matsushita Group, has more than 70 
manufacturing plants and operating offices in Malaysia. Sony Corporation, 
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headquartered in Tokyo, has their largest offshore factories located in Malaysia. 
The world’s top five electronic manufacturing services (EMS) have their 
operations concentrated in the state of Kedah. Some in Kuala Lumpur and others 
in Johore. Flextronix, Solectron, Jabil, and Celestica, just to name a few, are some 
of the world renowned EMS in Malaysia. 
Malaysia’s total export was RM533.79 and RM 480.74 billion for 
calendar year 2005 and 2004 respectively. Electrical and Electronic Products 
export accounted for RM 264.70 and RM 241.48 billion for calendar year 2005 
and 2004 respectively. This is 49.58% (year 2005) and 50.23% (year 2004) of the 
total exports. Adding other manufacturing sectors such as Goods and Articles, 
Apparel and Clothing, Timber and Timber Based Products, Palm Oil and Palm 
Oil Based Products, and others, the total manufacturing sector in Malaysia 
exported RM 466.30 and RM 408.00 billion in year 2005 and 2004 respectively. 
This manufacturing industry employs slightly over a million people 
(www.statistics.gov.my). Most of the companies in the Electrical and Electronic 
Products segments are MNCs. 
In 2006, Malaysia’s total trade was valued at RM1.1 trillion, an 
increase of 10.5 % from RM967.8 billion in 2005. Exports increased by 10.3 % to 
RM588.90 billion, and imports increased by 10.7 % to RM480.50 billion. This 
resulted in an increase of trade surplus to RM108.50 billion in 2006 
(www.mida.gov.my).  
Per statement by YB Dato’ Seri Rafidah Aziz (minister of 
International Trade and Industry, Malaysia) dated 13
th
 February 2007, “Despite 
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the increasing global competition, Malaysia continues to attract global foreign 
outflows, reflecting the country’s cost competitiveness as a manufacturing and 
export base. Foreign direct investments (FDIs) in approved projects in 2006 
amounted to RM20.2 billion, the highest level recorded to-date, compared with 
RM17.9 billion in 2005, and RM13.1 billion in 2004. The electrical and electronic 
industry attracted RM10.0 billion direct investment, which is 50 % of the total 
2006 FDIs. Out of 170 approved FDI projects, 111 projects (RM8 billion) were 
for expansion / diversification  of existing activities.” (www.mida.gov.my).  
As these MNC manufacturing plants produce or assemble different 
parts for a myriad of next-in-line customers, the various departments’ operations 
are mostly governed or guided to a certain extent by the guidelines set by the 
budgets allocated. Jones and Titmas (1955) researched into the setting up of 
effective budgeting in a manufacturing plant. They concluded that effective 
budgeting depends upon strong leadership and a simple, well coordinated 
management organization must be present, and that building and operating a 
successful budget program is a process. 
As most of the MNCs have being operating in Malaysia for many 
years or some new ones are mere extensions or subsidiaries of the headquarters in 
different host countries, periodical budgeting exercise is a common practice in 
manufacturing sectors. The significance and both its theoretical and practical 
contribution on this study of the relationship of TBC practice on wholly or 
majority share foreign owned MNCs’ subsequent and ultimate financial 
performance are expounded in section 1.5 and section 6.4 respectively. 
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Understanding the stated relationship would help to relate to the continued 
success of FDIs of MNCs’ manufacturing activities in Malaysia. 
Three contextual factors that may potentially have influenced the 
results of measuring TBC, cited by Van der Stede (2001), are (a) Organizational 
level, (b) Size, and (c) National Culture. These factors have being brought up due 
to the data collected were all referenced to large, diversified firms headquartered 
in Belgium.  
Two of the potential factors cited, organizational level and size, are 
two of the many measures within the extensively researched domain of 
organizational structure. In the last 40 years, organizational structure measures 
such as (a) centralization, (b) decentralization, (c) formalisation, (d) span of 
control, (e) size, (f) hierarchical levels (vertical differentiation), (g) 
divisionalisation (horizontal differentiation), (h) number of operating sites (spatial 
differentiation), (i) specialisation, and (j) departmentalisation (Smith, Grimm, 
Gannon & Chen, 1991; Hage, 1965; Pugh, Hickson, & Hinings, 1969; Blau, 1970; 
Burns & Stalker, 1961; Hage & Aiken, 1967; Aiken & Hage, 1971; Aiken et al., 
1980; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Hull & Hage, 1982; Damanpour, 1987, 1991; 
Child, 1974; Ford & Slocum, 1977; Fry, 1982; Van de Ven, 1976;  Perrow, 1972) 
have being extensively researched. 
Different dimensions of TBC lead to the aspect of level of ease with 
which budgetary targets can be achieved. Drury (1985) concluded that if a budget 
constrained style of evaluation is used, substantial amount of bias is likely to 
occur and result in budget slack. Findings by Cammann (1976) indicated that 
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when superiors stresses emphasis on budgetary information for organizational 
reward allocation, the subordinates responded by creating slack. 
Embedded within MNC manufacturing plants are different supporting 
organizational structures that may have influenced the level of ease with which 
budgetary targets can be achieved, which in turn affects firm financial 
performance. There is no literature that looks into the effect of extensively 
researched organizational structure on the relationship between TBC practice and 
budgetary slack and subsequently firm financial performance. This study attempts 
to establish the said relationship.  
     1.2 Research Problem 
The mind boggling excessive expenditure of some of the Enron senior 
staffs, prior to the firm’s total financial collapse in 2001 could have been avoided 
if TBC practices were enforced and budgetary slack being closely monitored 
within the Corporate Governance framework. In Malaysia, Perwaja Steel’s 
demise could have been avoided too if TBC practices were adhered to and 
budgetary slack closely scrutinized (Banaga et al, 1995; Chorafas, 2006). With 
this a priori, surely TBC practices enforcement with a close follow up on the 
induced budgetary slack contributes towards sound firm financial performance.  
Financial performance of many Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange public 
listed firms in Malaysia are less than desirable towards every end of the reporting 
quarter. A recent dismal financial performance of Malaysian Airline System with 
three quarters of losses in hundreds of millions of ringgit surely sends a clear 
indication that some financial control practices are amiss.  
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As with all firm financial issues, they are usually more complex than 
what meet our eyes. The organizational structures of Enron and Perwaja Steel 
differ from each other. The formal may be a decentralized organization, while the 
latter, more towards centralisation. These organization structural differences are 
believed to influence the relationship between TBC practices and ultimately firm 
financial performance. 
What are the financial performance of MNC manufacturing plants in 
Malaysia that enable them to continually reinvest in Malaysia by way of 
expansion / diversification of existing activities in Malaysia ? Malaysian FDI 
inflows has increased year upon year with the highest ever recorded in 2006, 
where electrical and electronic industry attracted 50 % of the total 2006 FDIs 
(www.mida.gov.my). Majority of these MNCs have annual budgeting exercise. 
How are the budget setting and attainment behaviour affect firm financial 
performance ? Does TBC practices lead ultimately to enhancement of financial 
performance ? Budgeting exercise loosely carried out, or, not strictly adhered to, 
or, budgetary slack incorporated, may have significant relationship to MNC firm 
financial performance. This study intends to research into the effect of tight 
budgeting control (TBC) practices on budgetary slack (proxy for level of ease in 
budget target achievement) that in turn affects MNC firm financial performance 
such as profitability. 
In sum, this study is trying to examine the role of TBC practices in 
subsequently affecting the enhancement of financial performance of majority or 
wholly foreign owned MNC manufacturing firms in Malaysia. On the other hand, 
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we also research into the role of organizational structure introduced / influenced 
by headquarters overseas to influence the relationship between TBC practices and 
its level of ease of budgetary target achievement that directly impacts firm 
financial performance.  
     1.3  Research Questions 
When it is near the end of current financial year, the senior 
management staffs of most majority or wholly foreign owned manufacturing 
MNC firms in Malaysia prepare budgets for the following financial year. Many 
firms’ budget allocated in the previous year stay unutilized due to excess 
budgetary slack creation and carry forward to current year, and thus did not 
realize the full potential of the budget allocated, while others over expended in an 
untimely manner.  
Private information known by the budgeters, if disclosed fully in the 
budgets setting exercise, can result in gains to the organization from improved 
resource allocation (Chalos and Haka, 1990). In other words, slack is more 
representative of the real financial position, which invariably leads to improved 
firm financial performance as a result of more efficient resource allocation. 
It was cited by Van der Stede (2001) that although accounting-based 
budgetary controls have being extensively researched in management accounting, 
the literature is still inconclusive as to whether TBCs are beneficial or detrimental 
to firm performance. Does emphasizing on meeting budget allocated in a timely 
manner contributes ultimately to financial performance ? Does paying attention to 
budget details and interim budget deviations by senior staff lead ultimately to 
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enhanced financial performance ? Has the intensity of budget related 
communication any bearing on firm’s ultimate  financial performance ? This 
study attempts to identify possible relationship between TBC practices and its 
ultimate firm financial performance. 
All manufacturing firms adopt different organizational structures in 
support of their businesses. Which organizational structure/s is/are amenable to 
adopt TBC for financial performance enhancement ? The research questions are 
therefore raised as followings. 
(1) What are the financial performances of wholly and majority foreign owned 
MNCs in Malaysia ?  
(2) How does TBC practices influence the level of ease with which budgetary 
targets can be achieved ? 
(3) How does the level of ease of attaining budgetary targets impact financial 
performance of wholly and majority foreign owned MNCs in Malaysia ? 
(4) How does organizational structure moderate the relationship between TBC 
practices and the level of ease with which budgetary targets can be achieved ? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The author is seeking a more predictable way of ascertaining a 
manufacturing firm’s financial performance with reference to the firm’s level of 
ease of budgetary target achievement and its relationship to TBC practices, and, 
how the relationship between TBC practices and level of ease of budgetary target 
achievement is influenced by the firm’s organizational structure.  
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The objectives are as follows : 
(1) To identify the level of financial performance of wholly and majority foreign 
owned MNCs in Malaysia. 
(2) To examine the relationship between TBC practices and the level of ease with 
which budgetary targets can be achieved in wholly and majority foreign 
owned MNCs in Malaysia. 
(3) To examine the relationship between the level of ease with which budgetary 
targets can be achieved and financial performance of wholly and majority 
foreign owned MNCs in Malaysia. 
(4) To identify the role of organizational structure in moderating the relationship 
between TBC practices and the level of ease with which budgetary targets can 
be achieved. 
      1.5 Significance of Study 
TBC practices is conceptualized to contain five dimensions (Van der 
Stede, 2001). They are firstly, budget emphasis. Hopwood’s (1972, 1973) 
measure of budget evaluative style has been used to assess budget emphasis (Van 
der Stede, 2001). However, Van der Stede added a new measure to reflect 
corporate management and its business unit general managers. Budget emphasis 
captures the extent to which top management considers meeting the budget on a 
short-term basis. 
Secondly, budget revision. This micro attribute measures the difficulty 
of getting top management to accept budget revisions during the year. Anthony 
and Govindarajan (1998) mentioned that there may be procedures to provide a 
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systematic updating of budgets, if budgets are used as an essential planning tool 
(Van der Stede, 2001) 
Thirdly, budget detail. If top management is only interested in bottom-
line of the budget and pays little attention to detail in budget reviews, business 
managers have more discretion to shift funds between line items to achieve their 
overall budget (Merchant & Manzoni 1989 as in Van der Stede 2001). 
Fourthly, budget deviation. Top managers are intolerant of interim 
budget deviations if they require business managers to keep the actual 
performance in line with the budget (Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998 as in Van 
der Stede 2001).  
Fifthly, budget communication intensity. The intensity of budget 
related communication is measured with reference to Simon’s (1995) distinction 
between interactive (subject to regular discussion between top and business 
managers, regardless of performance) versus diagnostic control (budgets receive 
passing consideration unless performace is considerably below expectation). The 
measure was built up from scratch by Van der Stede (2001) based largely on 
Simons (1995). 
These five dimensions are therefore not new to this present study. The 
study intends to establish a new relationship between these dimensions’ construct 
of TBC to the level of ease with which budgetary targets can be achieved that in 
turn affects firm’s financial performance. There is currently no literature that 
explores the said relationship with the mentioned budgetary slack as the 
mediating variable. The correlation of TBC five dimensions to the level of ease in 
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budget achievement shall be the first of its kind to be empirically tested in field 
research.  The researcher takes a step further to study the effect and impact of 
organizational structure on the relationship between TBC dimensions and the 
level of ease in budget achievement. This would be another maiden study in its 
own right. This study shall initiate many new insights into the postulated 
relationship. The results would contribute theoretically to an existing myriad and 
diverse field of management control. 
In terms of practical contribution, the completion of this study on 
wholly or majority foreign owned MNC manufacturing firms located in Malaysia 
could add to the knowledge of how TBC practices and level of ease in budget 
achievement contribute to the wholly or majority Malaysian owned 
manufacturing firm’s financial performance. The significant relationship between 
TBC practices, level of ease in budget achievement, and firm financial 
performance, to sound ambitious, can be considered an important framework that 
could be implemented and enforced by the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) 
worldwide to prevent the likes of Enron and Perwaja Steel via the framework of 
Corporate Governance. 
At the very least, this significant relationship can be considered by the 
Malaysian Accounting Board (MAB) or the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE) governing body to include TBC practices as one of the Corporate 
Governance (CG) standard guidelines. If implemented, a vast majority of public 
shareholders interest can be further protected from the potential agency action of 
the firms’ management staff (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
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The study would be able to provide further insights as to which 
organizational structures are more suitable in adopting TBC practices. We will be 
able to determine the type of manufacturing organization structures that would be 
able to synergise with the TBC practices adoption. The result of this study would 
assist existing MNC manufacturing firms, or those who are considering setting up 
subsidiaries in Malaysia, to understand what factors contribute to superior firm 
financial performance. The result would also help to understand which 
organizational structure typology to embark on that influence financial success.  
1.6 Definition of Variables 
The theoretical framework has one independent variable, one 
intervening variable, one dependent variable and one moderator moderating the 
relationship of the independent variable and intervening variable. The dimensions 
of which to be used to measure the relationships are stated as followings. 
(A) Independent Variables (Tight Budgetary Control) 
 Budget emphasis is the level of emphasis on meeting budget 
(Hopwood,1972, 1973; Brownell, 1985) 
 Budget revision is the level of acceptance to budget revision during the 
year (Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998) 
 Budget detail is the level of interest in specific budget line-items 
(Merchant & Manzoni, 1989) 
 Budget deviation is the level of tolerance for deviations from interim 
budget targets (Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998) 
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 Budget communication intensity is the level of intensity in budget related 
communications (Simons, 1995) 
      (B) Intervening Variable (Budget Slack) 
As in Dunk (1993), if subordinates perceive their rewards as   
dependent on budget attainment, they may try to build slack into their budgets to 
enhance their compensation prospects. Thus budget emphasis in performance 
evaluation induces the creation of budgetary slack (Baiman and Lewis, 1989). 
Budget Slack is defined and acting as the proxy for the level of ease 
with which budgetary targets can be achieved. 
(C) Dependent Variable (Financial Performance) 
As stated in Tuomela (2005), “It is natural to measure performance in 
financial terms as strategy aims at financial success. The cost of implementing 
financial indicators is low because they (or their raw data) are produced for 
external reporting purposes anyway”. 
It follows that the dimension profit and return is defined as the level of 
expectation of performance in targeted contribution margin, targeted profit or 
income, targeted cashflow, and others (Scott & Tiessen 1999) 
(D) Moderators (Organizational Structure) 
Centralisation represents the level of concentration of decisions 
making authority at a specific level in the hierarchy (Gosselin, 1997) 
Decentralisation is defined as the level of extent to which various 
types of power and authority are extended down through the organizational 
hierarchy (Steers, 1977) 
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1.7 Organisation of the Remaining Chapters 
The following Section 2 discusses the Literature Review on budgets 
and TBC practices, budget slack, financial performance variable, and 
organizational structure typologies. In Section 3, Theoretical Framework and 
Hypotheses are developed. The Research Design and Methodology is described in 
Section 4. Data Analysis and Findings are reviewed in Section 5. Section 6 
discusses and concludes with limitations and suggestions for further research  
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                                                          CHAPTER 2 
                                                LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing literatures, seminal papers and other 
articles that are of relevance to the topic of budgets, budgets as a control 
mechanism, TBC, budgetary slack, financial performance and organization 
structures. The individual dimensions of the construct, where literatures are 
available, are discussed. 
2.2 What are Budgets ? 
Budgets are accounting techniques to control costs through people and 
are frequently used as a basis for rewarding or penalizing those who use them as a 
guideline for cost control. Argyris (1953) mentioned three points about budgets as 
followings: 
(a) Budgets are evaluation instruments. Because they tend to set goals against 
which to measure people, they naturally are being complained about. 
(b) Budgets are one of the few evaluation processes that are always in writing and 
therefore concrete. Thus budgets are sometimes used as a “whipping posts” in 
order for the supervisors to release their feelings about many other totally 
unrelated problems. 
(c) Budgets are synonymous to pressure devises that produce unfavourable        
reactions  as do with other kinds of pressure regardless of origin. 
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2.3 Budgets as a Control Mechanism 
Drucker (1964) distinguishes between ‘controls’ and ‘control’. 
‘Controls’ are measurement and information that are purely a means to an end and 
the end is control. ‘Control’ makes sure work is done to fulfill the original 
intention and ‘controls’ are used to provide information to determine a control 
function to be taken. ‘Controls’ encompasses all methods and procedures that 
assist to direct employees towards achieving organizational objectives through 
congruence.  
Norman (1995) has identified three categories of control approaches 
that are adopted by Ouchi (1979), and Merchant (1998). They are as followings: 
(a) Action (behavioural) controls. 
(b) Personnel and culture (clan and social) controls. 
(c) Results (output) controls. 
Merchant (1998) defines action controls as to those situations where 
the actions are the focus of controls. The action controls are usable and effective 
only when managers know what actions are beneficial and have authority over the 
actions outcome. Behavioural controls involve observing the individual’s actions 
while they are working.  
Action/behavioural controls are appropriate only when the cause-and-
effect of actions and work relationships are well understood. This controls is more 
suited towards prevention of undesirable behaviour (Norman, 1995). 
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Merchant (1998) defines personnel controls as assisting the employees 
to execute their jobs well done through building the employee’s innate natural 
tendencies to control themselves. Cultural controls represent sets of values, social 
norms and beliefs that are commonly shared by members of the organization, 
which ultimately influence their actions. Codes of Conduct and group based 
rewards are some forms of mechanism to regulate and bring employees to align 
closer to the organizational goals. 
Results or output controls involve establishing performance measures 
to minimize undesirable behaviour, establishing performance targets, measuring 
performance, and providing rewards or punishments. Because individual goals 
differ with organizational goals, controls are necessary to optimize congruency. A 
major advantage of result controls is that the senior managers do not need to be 
very knowledgeable about the means required to achieve the results or be 
involved to observe the actions of subordinates (Norman, 1995). 
Management accounting control systems represent the predominant 
controls in most organizations. They are several reasons why accounting controls 
appeal to and are commonly practiced in vast majority of organizations. 
Firstly, all organizations have the need to explicitly express and 
aggregate the results of their wide range of dissimilar activities using a common 
measure. Secondly, accounting controls measures provide the profitability and 
liquidity measures that are essential to all organizations’ success and their 
respective stakeholders are able to monitor the firm’s financial performance 
through these measures. Thirdly, financial measures enable a common decision 
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rule based on common denominator of understanding when firms, for instance, 
decide on an alternate course of action. Fourthly, results controls in financial 
terms are effective also in uncertain environments when courses of actions are 
unclear, for instance, market development in an alien country (Norman, 1995). 
Management accounting control systems have two core elements. The 
first is the formal planning processes such as budgeting and long-term planning 
which are used to establish performance expectations for performance 
evaluations. The second is responsibility accounting which involves the setting up 
of responsibility centers, which are, cost or expense centers, revenue centers, 
profit centers, and investment centers (Norman, 1995). 
Despite all the stipulated advantages and theoretical justification of 
budget as a viable control mechanism, Stewart (pg. 122 Young, 1995), discusses 
why budgets are bad for business. He said that, “… when you are controlled by a 
budget, you are not controlling the business….. Reliance on budgets is the 
fundamental flaw in American management. They assume that everything 
important can be translated into this quarter’s or this year’s dollars, and that you 
can manage the business by managing the money. Just because a budget was not 
overspent does not mean it was well spent.”  
Stewart continues, “Budgets, forecast, plans, they become iniquitous 
when they are made to do more - when budget becomes management’s main tool to 
gauge performance, or when it distorts long-term planning, or blocks managers from 
shifting resources when they need to. Then the budget becomes an end to itself”. 
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“Managers do incredibly stupid things to make the budget, especially 
if incentive pay is at stake. They woo marginal customers. They cut prices too 
deeply. They overload distributors with goods, then take them back or shell out 
for a costly promotions to sell them”, cited Stewart. 
2.4 Tight Budgetary Control (TBC) 
Thus the present study has its significance herewith as to contribute to 
the understanding of the relationship of how tightening the budget control 
practices affect firm financial performance. The followings are the article reviews 
that relate to the notion of tightness of budgetary control and its empirically tested 
effects.  
As stated in Birnberg et al. (1983), “while Cleveland (1912) noted the 
early use of budgets as an account of official stewardship, it was not until 
Argyris’ (1952) pioneering study that a sustained interest developed in the 
behavioural aspects of using budgets in a management accounting system”. The 
budgetary control process was originally viewed as a rational and simple process 
where the superior’s set budget was communicated to the subordinate and 
subsequently used as a performance evaluation and for the setting of the next 
budget. 
Cited by Frow et al. (2005) that “Budgetary control is an 
organizational imperative, but the manner in which it is exercised presupposes 
stability, certainty and individual-level controllability (Ezzamel & Hart, 1987)”. 
Budgets stifle innovation and learning because the framework through which 
budgetary control is exercised encourages individualism, hierarchical dependence, 
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risk aversion and instrumentality (Roberts, 1991) and budget behaviours are 
antithesis of innovation and learning (Landfield-Smith, 1997). 
Consultants Hope and Fraser (1997), as cited by Frow et al. (1997), 
have advocated the demise of budgetary control systems on the basis that such 
systems are barriers to changes required to compete in the new ‘information age’. 
They argued that new management techniques developed under the ever changing 
environment cannot be successfully implemented if the management is “snapped 
back” into the old ways under the influence of budget. 
In the study by Frow et al. (2005) of a U.K. company that provides 
both hardware and software products and services, operating in a globally fast-
moving and fiercely competitive technology sector, seeks to maintain its market 
position through continual product development, exhibits a highly organic 
(decentralized) configuration with an emphasis on learning and innovation. 
Astoria, the U.K. company in Frow’s study, in order to be successful needs to 
cope with a high rate of strategic adaptation and change and be able to manage in 
the context of tight budgetary goals. For survival, Astoria has to focus on tight 
cost control. It is within both these pursuits of tight budgetary control and 
strategic adaptation and change that Frow et al concluded “The extant literature 
on budgeting has so far offered little understanding of how processes of budgetary 
control may be embedded within its wider organizational and strategic 
framework. As Hopwood (1983) has argued, much accounting research has 
tended to detach accounting from its organizational context, preferring instead to 
consider the effects accounting and budgets may have at the level of the 
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individual”. Frow et al. (2005) therefore calls for further research into the 
organizational nature of budgeting as the pace of organizational change 
intensifies. 
Birnberg et al. (1983) also details the dysfunctional behaviours of the 
budgetee under six broad categories. They are (a) smoothing, (b) biasing, (c) 
focusing, (d) gaming, (e) filtering, and (f) “illegal” acts. Smoothing is the willful 
distortion of the natural or preplanned flow of data without altering the actual 
activities within the organization. Biasing is the action of selecting a set of 
messages that are likely to be accepted and usually most favourable to the 
budgetee. Focusing is the action where certain aspects of the information set are 
enhanced (highlighted) or downplayed (hidden). Gaming is the manipulation of 
the recipient via smoothing, biasing and focusing, taking advantage of the 
superior (recipient)’s lack of knowledge. Filtering is where less desirable 
information set is being willfully delayed or omitted while the desirable 
information set is being communicated. “illegal” act involves violation of 
company rules and regulation, for example, collusion to swap budget line items 
for mutual benefit. One can infer that budget setting is a complex matter highly 
dependent on the budgetee’s behaviours. 
A study conducted by Covaleski (1983) on the role of budget control 
in hospital’s nursing services (Mid-Atlantic region, U.S.) reveals that the services’ 
outputs are unclear where activities cannot be standardized and centralized control 
is not wholly attainable. Budget is therefore used as a negotiating tool by the 
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middle managers to advocate their needs to the upper management, whereas, the 
upper management uses budget to affect control within department. 
Interesting results from the findings of Abernethy and Brownell (1999) 
in the Australian hospital industry show that performance, relative to other 
hospitals, would be enhanced if budgeting is used interactively when the 
organization is undergoing strategic change. Alternatively, when top management 
uses budgeting in an interactive mode with fellow subordinates, the performance 
increases from the learning and adaptation process required during the 
formulation and implementation phases of strategic change.  
Cited by Van der Stede (2000) that “if budgetary controls are too rigid 
and business unit managers have too little discretion, corporate management may 
choke all initiatives that promise long-term or less certain payoffs, as reported by 
Merchant (1990)”. Van der Stede (2000) has also mentioned that several studies 
in the management literature documented how an exclusive focus on accounting-
based controls encourage short term profit maximization at the expense of long 
term effectiveness and competitive strength as found in Hayes and Abernathy 
(1980), Laverty (1996), Merchant (1990) and Merchant and Bruns (1986). 
New insights concluded by Van der Stede (2000) are that profitable 
business units seem less affected by budgetary controls and enjoy more budget 
slack, whereas, business units with poor past performance seems to pursue more 
rigid controls via reduced slack which indirectly affect the managers’ concern 
about short term results. The study was carried out with 153 business unit 
managers in large, diversified firms headquartered in Belgium. 
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A study by Flamholtz (1983) postulated the concept of a tri-part 
control system that consists of the core system, structure and culture. The core 
system is made up of a varying four degree control with four basic element of 
planning, operations, measurement and evaluation. As for structure, Flamholtz 
cited, “organization theorists have argued that organization structure is developed 
as a response to the problem of control (Blau & Scott, 1962; Hall, 1972; Perrow, 
1977; Thompson, 1967)”. The culture aspect determines the nature of the other 
two components.  
For example, an entrepreneurial organization would require a culture 
that is based on individual initiative, flexibility, reduced bureaucratic control and 
independence of action. As such, the structure ought to be characterized by 
decentralistion rather than centralization. Flamholtz (1983) studied three U.S. 
based company and studied the relationship between accounting, budgeting and 
control, and concluded that budgeting and even an accounting system cannot be 
viewed as a control system per se. Budgeting needs to be viewed as a part of a 
carefully designed total system of organizational control. Linkages between 
budgeting and other essential elements of accounting measurement and control 
system need to be adequate for the total system to fulfill its intended functions.  
Concluding remarks from Merchant (1984) suggests that “organization 
characteristics such as functional and differentiation, and the degree of 
automation of production processes were all positively related to the formality of 
use of budgeting which includes greater importance placed on meeting the 
budgets, more formal budget communications, and greater manager participation 
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in budgeting activities”. He also remarked that product standardization (stage in 
product life cycle) and strength of market factors (strength of market position) 
seem to have little or no effect on budgeting. 
The study of voice (the subordinate’s involvement in the budgeting 
process) and explanation (subordinate’s communication of lack of confidence 
over final budget the superior sets) by Libby (1999), concluded that the 
combination of the opportunity for voice and the receipt of the explanation had 
the greatest positive effect on performance. This study implicates a direct link 
between an increased perception of fairness in budget setting and increased 
performance. The study was carried out with a group of first-year undergraduate 
business students to decode symbols which correlated to the budgets to be set. 
When managers are confronted with circumstantial uncertainty 
associated with role ambiguity, Marginson and Odgen (2005)’s analysis suggests 
that the managers may become more committed to achieving budget targets as 
budgets offer a source of structure and certainty. The budget therefore provides 
comfort and security. Such psychological return is conditional upon achieving the 
budgets. Exceeding or missing the budgets provides little comfort. The managers 
must then exercise “tight budgetary control” to achieve budgetary targets. The 
study was carried out in a major UK (FTSE100) based organization that supplies 
and maintains a range of communications and infotainment products and services 
to both major private sector companies and large public corporations. 
Results from Fisher et al (2002) suggests that when budgets are both 
used as a basis for allocating scarce productive resources and for evaluating 
